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Trade, Competition, and Intellectual
Property-TRIPS and its Antitrust

Counterparts
EleanorM. Fox*

ABSTRACT

This Article examines the Inteiface between TRIPS'
protection of intellectual property rights and antitrust law,
and the extent to which TRIPS invites a counterpartagreement
that would Internationalize intellectual property antitrust
rules.
Professor Fox argues that TRIPS does not call for
Internationalizing antitrust law, and that even developing
countries, which might find a greater need for antitrust
protection against abuse of dominance after TRIPS, might be
better served by developing and enforcing a national antitrust
law of their own.
She argues that TRIPS does, however, contemplate some
limits to antitrust, lest antitrust enforcement impair
protections guaranteed by TRIPS. Professor Fox proposes
that this interface develop on a case-by-case basis, and that
it be informed by a principle of respect for the scope of
antitrust vis-&-vls intellectual property rights in developed
bodies of national law.
Finally, she urges dialogue to develop principles linking
trade and antitrust, with trade-and-competition-restraining
uses of intellectual property to be treated as a subset of
broaderantitrustprinciples.

Walter Derenberg Professor of Trade Regulation, New York University
*
School of Law. The author thanks her colleague Rochelle C. Dreyfuss for her
helpful comments.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS), finalized at Marrakesh on April 15, 1994
as a component of the World Trade Organization (WTO), heightens
the level of world intellectual property protection by specifying
certain minimum standards that are basic norms of developed
Also, TRIPS requires nations to incorporate
legal systems.
specified norms and rules into national law and to enforce the
national law, and it provides for dispute resolution. Recognizing
that intellectual property (IP) protection may confer market power
and that market power may lead to its abuse, TRIPS explicitly
provides that nations may maintain laws deemed necessary to
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prevent abuse of intellectual property rights, including the
prevention of anticompetitive conduct, and that nations may
order compulsory licensing to remedy anticompetitive conduct.'
The agreement provides for a consultation and discovery
procedure when a member nation has reason to suspect that a

1.

Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of the

Multilateral Negotiations. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Apr. 15. 1994, Annex 1C: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, arts. 8(2), 30, 31, 40 [hereinafter TRIPS].
Article 8(2) provides that "Appropriate measures, provided that they are
consistent with the provisions of this Agreement, may be needed to prevent the
abuse of intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort to practices
which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of
technology."
Article 30 provides that "Members may provide limited exceptions to the
exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not
unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking
account of the legitimate interests of third parties."
Articles 31 and 3 1(k) provide:
Where the law of a Member allows for other use of the subject matter
of a patent without the authorization for the right holder, including use by
the government or third parties authorized by the government, the
following provisions shall be respected:
(k) Members are not obliged to apply the conditions set forth, in subparagraphs (b) [prior request for license] and (f) [use for supply of the
domestic market] above where such use is permitted to remedy a practice
determined after judicial or administrative process to be anti-competitive.
The need to correct anti-competitive practices may be taken into account
in determining the amount of remuneration in such cases. Competent
authorities shall have the authority to refuse termination of authorization
if and when the conditions which led to such authorization are likely to
recur....

Articles 40(1) and 40(2) provide:
1.
Members agree that some licensing practices or conditions
pertaining to intellectual property rights which restrain competition may
have adverse effects on trade and may impede the transfer and
dissemination of technology.
Nothing in this Agreement shall prevent Members from
2.
specifying in their national legislation licensing practices or conditions
that may in particular cases constitute an abuse of Intellectual property
rights having an adverse effect on competition in the relevant market. As
provided above, a Member may adopt, consistently with the other
provisions of this Agreement, appropriate measures to prevent or control
such practices, which may include for example exclusive grant back
conditions, conditions preventing challenges to validity and coercive
package licensing, in the light of the relevant laws and regulations of that
Member.
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firm of another member2 nation is violating antitrust laws by
anticompetitive licensing.
The question addressed by this Article is whether and to what
extent TRIPS suggests, invites, or requires a counterpart
agreement that would internationalize antitrust rules or norms as
they apply to intellectual property.
This inquiry begins by examining the TRIPS provisions that
bear on competition, and asks what antitrust law problems may
be raised by these provisions of TRIPS. The inquiry is followed by
an analysis of the costs and benefits of internationalizing

intellectual property antitrust (IP-antitrust). Finally, the author
makes a proposal for the direction of the world dialogue on
intellectual property, antitrust, and trade.
II. TRIPS AND ANTITRUST
A. The Relevant TRIPS Provisions

TRIPS has three types of provisions that may bear upon the
need for or limits of antitrust rules. The first is permissive; TRIPS
reserves the rights of nations to adopt and enforce antitrust law.
TRIPS recognizes that intellectual property, and particularly
intellectual property licensing, can be used in abusive ways, and

2.

Articles 40(3) and 40(4) provide:
3. Each Member shall enter, upon request, Into consultations with
any other Member which has cause to believe that an Intellectual
property right owner that is a national or domiciliary of the Member
to which the request for consultations has been addressed is
undertaking practices in violation of the requesting Member's laws
and regulations on the subject matter of this Section, and which
wishes to secure compliance with such legislation. without prejudice
to any action under the law and to the full freedom of an ultimate
decision of either Member. The Member addressed shall accord full
and sympathetic consideration to, and shall afford adequate
opportunity for, consultations with the requesting Member, and shall

co-operate through supply of publicly available non-confidential
information of relevance to the matter In question and of other
information available to the Member subject to [safeguarding
confidentiality].
4. A Member whose nationals or domicillaries are subject to
proceedings in another Member concerning alleged violation of that
other Member's laws and regulations on the subject matter of this
Section shall, upon request, be granted an opportunity for
consultations by the other Member under the same conditions as
those foreseen In paragraph 3 above [in publication].

19961

TRADE, COMPETITION,AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

485

some of those ways may harm competition as well as limit the
creation and diffusion of technology and restrain trade.
Accordingly, TRIPS gives explicit scope for national antitrust laws
that may limit intellectual property protection, lest antitrust
enforcement would be vulnerable to automatic challenge as an
impairment of TRIPS obligations. While TRIPS does not state how
far a nation may go to favor competition over IP protection, it
gives some guidance: National law as applied to licensing may
prohibit exclusive grant-backs, covenants not to challenge validity
of a patent, and forced packaging. Also, compulsory licensing
may be ordered as a remedy.
Second, TRIPS provides a consultation and discovery
procedure.
This procedure enables a nation enforcing its
antitrust laws against non-nationals that may be abusing IP
rights in the regulating nation to enlist the aid of the suspected
violator's nation. The requested nation agrees to consult and to
supply information.
Third, TRIPS implicitly recognizes that some nations' laws, or
at least the laws' application, may violate TRIPS or impair
obligations under TRIPS.
In this context, nations agree to
consultation and dispute resolution.
The following discussion addresses each of these categories
with a view to considering whether international antitrust rules
are an important counterpart to TRIPS.
B. The Right of Nations to Adopt and EnforceAntitrust
TRIPS reserves to nations the right to control anticompetitive
practices. TRIPS states: "Nothing in this Agreement shall prevent
Members from specifying [prohibited practices] that may in
particular cases constitute an abuse of intellectual property rights
3
having an adverse effect on competition in the relevant market."
Thus, nations are allowed to adopt antitrust laws to prevent harm
to themselves in their internal markets.
Protecting oneself and one's citizens in one's own internal
market is traditionally a national task. Nations normally have
antitrust laws to protect their competition systems from abuses of
power in their own markets. If they have none, they may adopt
such laws. If they wish to adopt a "world class" law, they might
choose the European Community (EC) model or the U.S. model,
which are now the two most prominent world standards. If
nations prefer, they can design their own law, as long as it does

3.

Id. art. 40(2).
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not take away the rights granted by TRIPS (a subject discussed in
Part D below).
While TRIPS does not mandate an international antitrust law,
nations could nonetheless decide that an international antitrust
law of intellectual property is a helpful complement to TRIPS.
This Article explores this proposition in Part III.
C. Positive Comity

TRIPS provides for reciprocal relationships known as "positive
comity."
Under positive comity, member nation A agrees
sympathetically to consider aiding nation B when a national of A
has apparently engaged in anticompetitive licensing practices in
the territory of nation B. In particular, upon request, the home
country of the licensor agrees to supply relevant nonconfidential
4
information.
This is not an antitrust rule but a cooperative mechanism to
aid in law enforcement. It is an important concept developed
through bilateral negotiations. 5 This type of mechanism first
appeared in an executive agreement between the United States
and the European Community. 6 Incorporation of positive comity
into multilateral instruments is a wise and important step.
However, it does not establish or seek to establish antitrust rules.
D. The Limits of Antitrust in View of TRIPS

1. The Problem
TRIPS implicitly acknowledges that there may be a clash
between TRIPS protection and competition law. Since aggressive
antitrust law or enforcement could impair the intellectual
property protection that TRIPS assures, drawing the line beyond
which competition law (as well as unfair competition law) may not
go is an enterprise special to TRIPS. This enterprise concerns

4.

See Id. art. 40(3) (reproduced supranote 2).

5.
See, e.g., Diane P. Wood. The Internationalizationof Antitrust Law, 44
DEPAUL L. REV. 1289 (1995); Eleanor M. Fox, Market Access, Antitrust and the
World Trading System: En Route to TRAMS-Trade-Related Antitrust Measures (Nov.
20, 1995) (presented at Congress on Competition Policy in the Process of
International Integration, Italian Antitrust Authority, Rome) (published version
forthcoming 1996).
6.
Agreement Between the United States and the European Community
on Antitrust Cooperation and Coordination, Sept. 23, 1991, 4 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) 13,504 (voided for technical deficiency and validly executed In 1995).
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setting the limits on competition laws, not affirmative formulation
and enforcement of competition law. It is an exercise that nations
that have both antitrust and IP traditions have undertaken and
resolved-however uncertainly--for themselves. In the context of
TRIPS, the questions are: (1) where should the international line
be drawn, (2) by what process and through what institutions, and
(3) in drawing this line, are any guiding principles inherent in
TRIPS itself?
The interface problem is probably most commonly raised in
the context of the monopolization or abuse of dominance violation
of competition law. It may also be raised in connection with tying
or packaging agreements, licensing and distribution agreements,
and joint ventures. The interface problem surfaces at the point of
tension between enforcing the competition law and respecting the
enjoyment of intellectual property rights. Presented below are five
practical interface problems where a balance must be struck
between protecting competition and protecting IP by the two
major rights and where the balance has been struck differently
competition law systems.

First, let us suppose that Eastman Kodak has a monopoly
position in the market for amateur color film. It has patents on
its film. If Kodak charges a sustained monopoly price for amateur
color film, has it violated the monopoly law or merely exercised a
right inherent in its otherwise lawful monopoly? United States
law answers that there is no antitrust violation. 7 European
Community law, reflecting greater faith in the capacity of
government to regulate wisely and greater concern about use of
private power to exploit others, gives the opposite answer.
"Excessively" pricing even a patented good runs afoul of Article 86
of the EC Treaty of Rome.8
Second, E.I. du Pont has the best, lowest cost technology for
making paint whitener (titanium dioxide), which position it
achieved both by its scientific prowess and by the happenstance
that its competitors' technology was found to contain pollutants
and was suddenly burdened by a high tax. Du Pont develops a
plan to expand; it will build new plants, attract the business of its
now higher-cost competitors, and thereby hope to gain a
monopoly share of the market. Its competitors seek to license the
patented du Pont technology, but du Pont refuses to grant
licenses on any terms. Has du Pont violated the monopoly law, or

See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir.
7.
1979). cert. denied. 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
See Case 40/70, Sirena S.r.l. v. Eda S.r.l., 1971 E.C.R. 69; Case
8.
53/87, Consorzio Italiano v. Renault, 1988 E.C.R. 6039, para. 16; cf. Id. para. 17.
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has it properly exercised a patent right? Under United States law,
du Pont has done no more than exercise an inherent patent
right. 9
European Community law, more concerned than the
United States with competitors' access to low-cost inputs and
more skeptical of the claim that a government grant of access will
impair incentives to invent, is likely to give the opposite answer.1 0
A third example concerns the distribution system of the
German company Grundig, one of many producers of electronics
products such as television sets and tape recorders. Grundig Is
setting up its distribution system in Europe. In France its chosen
distributor is Consten.
Grundig gives Consten the right of
exclusive distribution of Grundig electronics products in France
and enables Consten to obtain the French trademark GINT
(Grundig International) to protect its right and duty to develop the
French market. To safeguard Consten's exclusivity and thereby
to obtain better and more accountable distribution, and thus to

compete better against other brands, Grundig agrees to help keep
non-Consten GINT product (parallel imports) out of France. If
Consten invokes its trademark and sues trademark infringers,
have Consten and Grundig violated the law against competitiondistorting contracts, or have they merely exercised rights inherent
in intellectual property? Under European Community law, the
enterprises have committed one of the gravest violations of
competition law. 1
United States law would find no violation,
with or without the protection of intellectual property. 12
As a fourth example, Inventco has obtained a patent in a
competitive field of virtual reality environments for training brain
surgeons. It agrees to license Ventureco, a joint venture formed
to develop more advanced applications, on the condition that
Ventureco will exclusively grant back all technology developed
from Inventco's patents. Has Inventco violated the monopoly law
by contracting for an exclusive grant-back, or has it simply
exercised IP rights? European Community law is likely to find a

9.
See In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. (titanium dioxide), 96 F.T.C.
650 (1980).
10.
See Cases C-241/91P-C-242/91P, Radio Telefis Eireann v.
Commission (Magill), 1995 E.C.R. 1-743; cf. Case 238/87, Volvo AB v. Erik Veng
(UK) Ltd., 1988 E.C.R. 6211, paras. 8-9.
11.
See Cases 56-58/64, Establishments Consten and Grundig S.A.R.L. v.
Commission (Consten and Grundig), 1966 E.C.R. 299 (ruling that the
Commission properly excluded evidence of interbrand competition); Cases 100103/80, SA Musique Diffusion Frangalse v. Commission (Pioneer), 1983 E.C.R.
1825.
12.
Continental T.V.. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). See
Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
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violation.13 Under U.S. law, the framework for analysis is quite
different. There is no rigid rule. The outcome depends upon
anticompetitive effects. One must first inquire, "What is the
market?" If Inventco's patent does not confer significant power in
a well-defined market, or if the grant back clause was necessary
to induce Inventco to form the joint venture, the clause will be
upheld under U.S. antitrust law. 4
As a fifth example, company A has achieved an enduring
world monopoly through good works accompanied by patent
protection, constant improvement patents, and the aggressive
embrace of all opportunities to meet new demand. Has it violated
monopoly law? May national law empower antitrust authorities

to order a break-up if that is organically feasible, or compulsory

15
licensing? United States law would authorize neither option.
European Community law would not authorize a break-up, but

might possibly decree compulsory licensing.' 6 Certain Central
17
European countries would grant the power of break-up.

Professor F.M. Scherer has proposed compulsory licensing, as one
of his eleven proposals for a world competition system, where a
firm achieves forty percent or more of world trade for a period of
longer than twenty years on the basis of valid patents and
copyrights. 18

Under the Technology Transfer Regulation, Commission Regulation
13.
240/96, 1996 O.J. (L 31) 2, a block exemption is available for enterprises'
licensing agreements that contain only permitted clauses and no prohibited
clauses. A clause imposing an obligation to assign improvements back to the
licensor is a prohibited clause.
14.
See U.S. Dep't of Justice & Fed. Trade Commission, Antitrust
Guidelinesfor the Licensing of Intellectual Property, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
13,132, § 5.6 (Apr. 6, 1995) [hereinafter U.S. IP Antitrust Guidelines]. However,
such a use of leverage could be patent misuse-a doctrine that nations may also
apply to limit use of power derived from intellectual property rights.
See In re I.E. DuPont de Nemours & Co. (titanium dioxide), 96 F.T.C.
15.
650 (1980); Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147,
1184-89 (1st Cir. 1994).
16.
See Cases C-241/91P-C-242/91P. Radio Telefis Eireann v.
Commission (Magill), 1995 E.C.R. 1-743. Cf. Case 238/87, AB Volvo v. Erik Veng
(UK) Ltd., 1988 E.C.R. 6211 (stating conditions under which refusal to supply
products (car body parts) produced from a registered design is arbitrary, unfair,
and thus illegal).
See, e.g., Law of Poland on Counteracting Monopolistic Practices, art.
17.
12, para. 1 (1990, as amended 1995): "State enterprises, cooperatives and
companies under Commercial Law that have a dominant position in the market
can be divided or liquidated if they permanently restrain competition or the
conditions for its emergence."
18.
See F.M. SCHERER, COMPETITION POLICIES FOR AN INTEGRATED WORLD
ECONOMY 94-95 (1994). Professor Scherer comments as follows on his proposal:
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Thus we see a set of interface problems and a diversity of
perspectives regarding them. The solutions differ in view of
different preferences 19 regarding the weight to be given to the
protection of the competition process, free movement,
competitors' rights of access, and buyers' rights not to be
exploited, as compared with the weight to be given to the
protection of intellectual property holders' rights to exclusive
enjoyment of their intellectual property and the perceived or
presumed effect of such preferences in increasing incentives to
invent. 20 Whether the tension is resolved in favor of the IP right
or the competition value varies not only from country to country
but also within one country over time, as reflected by the marked
swing in the U.S. position over the last quarter century. When
the United States was less industrialized, less challenged by
foreign competitors, and not a net exporter, it preferred 2more
1
competition to more protection of intellectual property rights.

It is improbable that nations would agree to the structural fragmentation
of dominant enterprises residing within their borders.
Continued
dominance of a world market is likely to result only from superior
performance, the control of unique natural resources, or the control of

intellectual property. Superior performance Is desirable and should not be
challenged. Little or nothing can be done internationally about the control
of unique natural resources. Patent and copyright protection for a
considerable time Is Justified as an inducement to innovation. However,
dominance can be perpetuated, with undesirable consequences for both
pricing and the rate of technological progress, through the accumulation
of patents and copyrights on improved products and processes. This
proposal will constrain monopoly power that persists beyond the intended
life of original patent grants.
Id. at 95 (footnote omitted).
19.
This refers to different preferences even among developed countries.
When less developed nations' preferences are considered, as they should be, the
problem becomes yet more complex. Many less developed countries may prefer
competition, by copying and otherwise, to intellectual property protection,
because of the distributional consequences. Note that developed countries
disagree on the respective reaches of antitrust and intellectual property even
when their only concern is how best to improve allocative efficiency.
20.
The experts do not agree on what balance most promotes significant
inventiveness. Moreover, in some respects robust protection of dominant IP
holders can undermine incentives to invent by less well-established and less wellintegrated firms. See F.M. SCHERER & DAVID Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE
AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 630-60 (3d ed. 1990). But see Thomas M. Jorde &
David J. Teece, Innovation and Cooperation: Implications for Competition and
Antitrust, In COLLABORATION AMONG COMPETITORS: ANTITRUST POLICY AND ECONOMICS
887 (Eleanor M. Fox & James T. Halverson eds., 1991).
21.
See, e.g., United States v. Line Materials Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948);
Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944). See Bruce Wilson,
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of
Justice, Remarks Before the Annual Joint Meeting of the Michigan State Bar
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An appreciation of this diversity informs the answer to the
questions: Where should TRIPS draw the interface line, and by
what process should one decide the point at which competition
law invades TRIPS protections? Do any general principles for
establishing the interface emerge from TRIPS itself?
2. Developing the Interface

a. A Common Law Approach
There are two approaches to developing the interface between

TRIPS IP protections and competition law: (1) writing in advance
rules that establish when competition law enforcement will be
deemed an undue intrusion into TRIPS rights; and (2) embracing
a bottom-up, common-law style, case-by-case approach to
development of the law of the interface.
TRIPS itself contains the beginnings of a "positive lisfmeasures that a competition law can take without offending
TRIPS. Namely, national law may prohibit exclusive grant-backs,
prohibit covenants not to challenge patent validity, prohibit
coercive package licensing, and order compulsory licensing for
antitrust violations. This first-cut positive list, while helpful in
setting the stage, is not a robust step in the direction of
answering the interface question, because it is enabling rather
than limiting.2 2
Consistent with TRIPS (one can imply),
competition law can continue to do most things it ordinarily does.
A complete positive list would be lengthy and might omit what
should be allowed. But in any event, the enabling of antitrust is
not the issue; the issue is the limits to antitrust.
Writing interface rules in advance would be a daunting and
probably unwise enterprise. The enterprise is daunting because,
as shown in the examples above, the interface is the point of
tension. Resolution of the tension is highly sensitive to history,

Antitrust Law Section and the Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law Section
(Sept. 21, 1972), partially reprinted In 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,126. The
Department of Justice disassociated itself from these views in 1981. See Abbot B.
Lipsky, Jr., Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S.
Department of Justice, Remarks Before the American Bar Association Antitrust
Section (Nov. 5, 1981), reprintedin 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) V13,129.

22.

But see Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, International Competition Rules for

the GATT-MTO World Trade and Legal System, 27 J. WoRLD TRADE, Dec. 1993, at
35. "Yet the scope of competition rules already existing in the TRIPS Agreement
(e.g., the detailed conditions laid down in Article 31 for compulsory licensing)
remains impressive." Id. at 59.
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culture, context, empirics, and beliefs, and nations disagree as to
how the tension should be resolved. Rule-writing in advance of
problems is insensitive to the very nuances that may reveal the
wise solution.
By contrast, case-by-case evolution is based on the inevitably
complex facts and context that can give roots and legitimacy to
law formation.
TRIPS itself, being geared to case-by-case
consultation and dispute resolution, 23 may be interpreted as
leaning in the direction of case-by-case development of the
24
interface.
b. A Guiding Principle-Does TRIPS Contain the Germs of a
Guiding Principle for the Interface?
TRIPS contains several specifically permitted antitrust
prohibitions or remedies, but these are not general principles. A
general principle to guide development of the interface is,
however, inherent in TRIPS. That principle can be derived from a
presumed expectation of the member nations: existing developed
systems of antitrust are presumptively legitimate, even though
they may function as a limitation on intellectual property rights.
According to this principle, a nation's existing state-of-the-law
that resolves the IP-antitrust tension in favor of more competition
rather than more IP protection presumptively is to be respected in
the international system.
Since the two most established
competition law models are those of the United States and of the
European Community, the interface decisions contained in these
bodies of law, among others, would presumptively be entitled to
deference.
Such a principle cannot be expected to be enthusiastically
embraced by the United States. That is because EC law, from a
U.S. perspective, obliterates certain intellectual property rights in
the name of undistorted competition even while the competition
law enforcement advances neither real competition nor real
25
market integration.
The presumptive (and not conclusive) quality of the general
principle, however, preserves an avenue for international dialogue
where one nation's competition system is alleged to intrude

23.

TRIPS, supra note 1, arts. 40(3), 64.

24.
It would be helpful if the interface questions could be resolved under a
system of stare decisis so that a body of law, and thus guidance, could evolve.
25.
See Cases 56-58/64, Establishments Consten and Grundig S.A.R.L. v.
Commission (Consten and Grundig), 1966 E.C.R. 299. See also Barry E. Hawk,
System Failure: Vertical Restraints and EC Competition Law, 32 COMMoN MKT. L.
REv. 973 (1995).
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excessively on the intellectual property of another nation's citizen.
Take as an example the European challenge in the 1970s to IBM's
practice of changing interfaces on its main frame computers
without notifying its rival manufacturers of plug-compatible

equipment of the design of the new interface.

The European

Commission began proceedings against IBM Europe on the
ground that, by nondisclosure, IBM had abused its dominant
position in Europe in violation of Article 86 of the EC Treaty of
Rome.
The Competition Directorate of the EC Commission
proposed relief that would have required IBM Europe to
predisclose all new interfaces. IBM and the U.S. Government
resisted on grounds that the interface was an intellectual property
design devised to improve the functioning of the IBM equipment,
not a changed plug configuration designed to impose costs on the
competitors.
The Competition Directorate insisted that the
proposed relief was procompetitive
and would enhance
competition in the markets for plug-compatible equipment. IBM
and the U.S. Department of Justice insisted that the relief was
anticompetitive and would undermine IBM's incentives to invent,
and that it would be an extraterritorial appropriation of IBM's
intellectual property because IBM could not technically confine
compliance to Europe; compliance would as a practical matter
26
mean forced disclosure of IBM's trade secrets to the world.
Before TRIPS, had the EC reduced its proposal to a
Commission decision and ultimately to a Court of Justice
judgment, IBM and the United States would have had no forum in
which to air the claim that EC law impermissibly intruded upon
intellectual property rights. TRIPS provides such mechanisms,
through international dialogue and dispute resolution. Under
this author's proposed principle, the EC resolution of the IPantitrust tension would be entitled to a presumption of validity;
but even so, IBM or the United States would have the opportunity
to urge that the EC law intrudes impermissibly on intellectual
property rights whose protection is safeguarded by TRIPS. 2 7

26.
The dispute was settled by a decree requiring the disclosure only if,
after IBM announced an interface change, it did not bring the announced new
product to market within four months. See Eleanor M. Fox, Monopolization and
Dominance in the United States and the European Communlty-Efflclency,
Opportunity, and Fairness, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 981, 1011-17 (1986).

This example is perhaps more poignant than an example without spillover
problems, because, given this scenario (if it occurred today), the United States
would wish not only to influence the development of the interface under TRIPS
but also to protect its sovereignty from extraterritorial interference.
27.
Under world competition principles that the author proposed
elsewhere, the deciding body would be obliged to take account of extraterritorial
impacts on competition, efficiency, and technological progress as if such impacts
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III. SHOULD NATIONS INTERNATIONALIZE ANTITRUST LAW AS APPLIED TO
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY?

A. Introduction
Some commentators have proposed, even without regard to
TRIPS, that IP-antitrust law should be internationalized. 28 Under
TRIPS, the claim has been made more strongly. For example, at
least one commentator argues that TRIPS' command to protect
intellectual property rights increases the need for credible law
29
that protects against abusive exploitation of such rights.
B. The Benefits
An internationalized IP-antitrust law could round out the
enterprise of TRIPS and the gains of the successive trade
negotiations culminating in the Uruguay Round. It could do so
(1) by assuring that anticompetitive practices neither discredit
TRIPS nor undermine the cumulative gains in trade and (2) by
providing a single set of principles for trade-restraining conduct,
thus increasing certainty, saving costs, leveling the playing field,
and smoothing the flow of trade. Moreover, an international IPantitrust law could provide particular benefits to less developed
countries that lack antitrust laws and the capabilities to enforce
them, and that would profit from a common front on antitrust
principles, preventing a race to the bottom.
As for rounding out TRIPS, internationalized antitrust is not
called for by TRIPS. TRIPS calls for a concept of the limits of

antitrust; it does not call for formulation of the core and normal
scope for antitrust.
As for undermining the gains in free trade of Uruguay and
the preceding rounds, it is indeed possible that intellectual
property could be exploited anticompetitively in ways that

occurred within its own community. See Eleanor M. Fox, Competition Law and the
Agendafor the WTO: Forging the Links of Competition and Trade, 4 PAC. RIM L. &
POL'Y J. I (1995).
See, e.g., Wolfgang Flkentscher, On the Proposed InternationalAntitrust
28.
Code, in ANTITRUST: A NEW INTERNATIONAL TRADE REMEDY? 345 (John 0. Haley &
Hiroshi Iyori eds., 1995); Petersmann, supra note 22; cf. John H. Jackson, GATT
and the Future of InternationalTrade Institutions. 18 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 11 (1992).
29.
See J. H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual
Property Protection Under the TRIPS Component of the WTO Agreement, 29 INT'L
LAW. 345 (1995); J. H. Reichman, Beyond the Historical Lines of Demarcation:
Competition Law, Intellectual Property Rights, and International Trade After the
GATT's Uruguay Round, 20 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 75 (1993).
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frustrate free trade, and that the greater protection of monopoly
rights carries with it more opportunity for restraining trade. But
this point is not different from the point that market power can be
exploited anticompetitively in ways that frustrate free trade. The
antitrust law applied to intellectual property is a subset of
antitrust law in general; it should be informed by the more
general concepts of antitrust law and should not develop an
unrelated life of its own.30 It would be unwise to separate
"intellectual property antitrust" from the body of its parent.

Principles can be developed on the more general trade-antitrust
level, some of which will have particular regard to intellectual
property. This point is discussed further in Part IV.
The virtues of a unified set of principles, and thus of
increased certainty, are said to justify an international IPantitrust law. In theory, a single set of principles applied by
common institutions has appeal. The appeal appears to be
simplicity, transactions cost-savings, and what is called a level
playing field. A single set of rules would save transactions costs.
Businesses and their counselors would not need to learn multiple
sets of rules, and businesses would not need to alter their
operations to fit the law of each nation. Such simplicity, however,
assumes not only that nations can agree to the "right" rules for
the world but also that the international rules, where applicable,
would preempt national rules. If nations could agree to a set of
rules with a meaningful level of specificity, and to mechanisms to
enforce those rules in a credible and trustworthy way, and if the
international law were preemptive, simplicity benefits would
indeed flow.
Each of these three conditions, however, is
extraordinarily demanding. None of the three conditions is likely
to be met in the foreseeable future.
The level playing field concept may entail nothing more than
the concept implied above-aspiring to a uniform set of principles
that countries would choose, ostensibly being satisfied that the
principles are right for them. If it entails more, the concept may
be perverse or irrelevant to antitrust. The level playing field
epithet is commonly used in circumstances where regulatory law
increases the costs of doing business. The goal is commonly
invoked either to protect incumbents from the competition of
lower-cost competitors or to protect values imbedded in the law
from erosion caused by systems-competition to attract business
(race to the bottom). Country A, for example, having a certain

30.
See U.S. IP Antitrust Guidelines. supra note 14, § 2.1 (treating
intellectual property licensing problems as a subset of antitrust. General
antitrust principles are applied).
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regulation (such as environmental clean-up obligations), wishes
country B to have the same regulation, even in the absence of
spill-over problems, so that country A's business will not be
outcompeted by the lower-cost business of country B, so that
investment in country A will not flee to country B in order to take
advantage of the lower costs, and so that the above two
phenomena do not put pressure on country A to degrade Its law.
Leveling the playing field usually means increasing the regulatory
costs of everyone to the level of country A, thus removing the
comparative competitive advantage of country B. So stated,
leveling the playing field is anticompetitive and trade-decreasing
(i.e., there will be less output at the higher price).
Level-playing-field problems do not attend antitrust law, at
least when antitrust is applied in the service of market efficiency,
which is the case in the United States today. Competition and
antitrust, being market-freeing, normally make firms more rather
than less cost effective. Unlike environmental law, there are no
inherent, minimum basic costs of antitrust to business. To the
extent that non-U.S. antitrust law handicaps large, efficient firms
in order to protect less efficient, smaller firms, thus imposing
costs of antitrust, one can be sure that the United States, and
undoubtedly other nations as well, would not accept such a world
standard (i.e., we handicap our efficient firms to protect our small
business; therefore you must, too.). Leveling the playing field Is
not a reason for internationalizing the antitrust law, as it relates
to intellectual property or more generally.
One might make an argument for the interests of less
developed countries (LDCs). One could argue that LDCs need
antitrust in order to control the predations of multinational IP
owners within their borders, especially in view of the nations'
obligations under TRIPS. Indeed, TRIPS itself recognizes that
nations may feel the need for antitrust in light of TRIPS.
However, as noted above, law to protect one's citizens is
normally national law, and nations are free to adopt the antitrust
law of their choosing. Nations may also adopt a formulation of
the effects doctrine, assuring that their law reaches foreign actors
selling or licensing into their nation, and thus attempting to
assure that their law is adequate to its task. Moreover, the
positive comity extended by TRIPS should aid in the task of
enforcing law against abusing non-nationals.
Some commentators suggest that, while LDCs may need
antitrust, they cannot bring their legislators to adopt it, perhaps

because of statist interests and perspectives or because of bribery
and corruption.
However, if a nation rejects antitrust for
whatever legitimate or illegitimate reasOns, one may wonder
whether it would not be unduly interventionist and presumptuous
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for the world to cajole the nation into adopting such law for the
sole purpose of protecting the latter's citizens.
A second companion claim is made by commentators that,
while some LDCs have antitrust statutes, they have no will to
enforce them. Therefore, the LDCs are in need of an international
system. To this claim, the same concern of imperialism applies.
A third companion claim is made by commentators that
adoption of antitrust laws by each LDC will cause a race to the
bottom; nations will hesitate to enact the antitrust restrictions
they think best. Though LDCs may prefer intrusive constraints
on the exploitation of intellectual property rights, countries that
adopt the strictest scrutiny fear they will experience the flight of
investment to less demanding nations. To this claim there are
three partial responses.
First, TRIPS itself sets a cap on "overly intrusive" antitrust
law; if nations use antitrust to "take back" the IP rights protected
by TRIPS, they will violate TRIPS. And, of course, if they apply
the restrictions differentially to non-nationals, they will also
violate TRIPS.
It may be the case that EC law will become the bellwether for
defining the TRIPS competition law interface, 3 and that the LDCs
will find the European model sympathetic to their objectives. The
fact that EC competition law is a major world model the
prevalence of which is expanding exponentially3 2 suggests that
EC competition law does not trigger a flight of investment. Thus,
the LDCs could probably adopt EC principles without expecting a
flight of capital or a race to the bottom.
Second, the expressed concern of LDCs will not be allayed by
internationalizing an antitrust law of intellectual property. One
cannot expect that an agreement on a set of international rules in
this area will be achieved that will please the LDCs that

essentially wish to rein in the power of multinationals and to
preserve their own economies and cultures from being "depleted"
by Western capitalism.3 3 The competition rules most likely to be
accepted as international standards are the United States

31.
This is a natural consequence of the principle proposed in Part II.D
that antitrust "business as usual" is not an impairment of TRIPS. From a U.S.
vantage, EC competition law is relatively disrespectful of IP rights at the interface.
32.
See Fox, supra note 5; Eleanor M. Fox, The Developing Antitrust Law of
the Vlsegrad Countries-CentralEurope Moves Into Step with the European Union,
ANTITRUST REP., Oct. 1995, at 3.

33.
See Judith Chin & Gene Grossman, Intellectual Property Rights and
North-South Trade, In THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 90 (Anne 0.
Krueger & Ronald W. Jones eds., 1990); Carlos Alberto Primo Braga, The
Economics of Intellectual PropertyRights and the GATT: A View from the South, 22
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 243 (1989).
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competition rules, simply because most U.S. advocates believe
that more intrusive rules are seriously harmful to competition,
consumer welfare, inventiveness, and competitiveness. Advocates
for the U.S. rules would not agree to international antitrust rules
that are more intrusive on intellectual property rights as a matter
of principle. Furthermore, United States participation would be
important to the meaningfulness of a world agreement. To the
LDCs, whose main objective is to control multinational power, the
U.S. perspective-being exceedingly respectful of the intellectual
property interest vis-A-vis the competition interest-may be "the
bottom."
Third, if LDCs need solidarity, the solidarity they need Is not
with the world but among like-minded countries. LDC fora for
interchanges, cross-fertilization, and, possibly, uniform or model
competition law development could usefully be created, within
and beyond the emerging LDC (e.g. African) free trade areas.
For all of these reasons, the benefits of internationalizing IPantitrust law are somewhat illusory. Also, the limits are distinct
and the costs are high.
C. The Limits of an Enterpriseto InternationalizeIP-Antitrust
If agreement of the United States, the EC nations, the Asian
nations, and the LDCs, among others, is necessary to finalize a
set of rules or principles, there is no set of rules and principles
specifically devoted to IP-antitrust that would be acceptable to all.
The diversity of perspective is due in part to the fact that the
United States views antitrust law as efficiency-creating and
technological-progress-creating.
It is not concerned with
"unfairness," including disparate bargaining power. The United
States sees intellectual property as property that ought to be
protected. It views limits on intellectual property as disincentives
to invent, impairing progress generally as well as impairing the
competitiveness of U.S. finms in the global economy.
LDCs tend to view intellectual property as a public good
(despite the formal concessions they made in TRIPS, largely in
order to get increased market access rights).3 4 They tend to view
access to intellectual property as important not only to take the
edge off the power of the multinationals but also to give their
34.

See J. H. Relchman, Compliancewith the TRIPS Agreement- Introduction

to a Scholarly Debate, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 363 (1996). Cf. Martin Adelman,

Prospects and Limits of PatentProtection In the TRIPS Agreement- The Case of India,
29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 507 (1996) (certain developing countries, such as India,

anticipating increasing innovation by their own nationals, recognized the benefits

to be gained by protection of their own intellectual property).
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firms inputs necessary both to serve their people (e.g. with
affordable medicines) and to compete externally.
The fact is that what the United States calls "antitrust" is not
what the LDCs call "antitrust." To some extent, the two bodies of
doctrine are opposites. United States antitrust today is largely
based on efficiency policy (often called Chicago School economics),
which aims to increase aggregate wealth not redistribute wealth.
"Antitrust" is a misnomer for turn-of-the-twentieth-century U.S.
For better or worse, efficiency policy
competition policy.
advocates have succeeded in nearly abolishing antitrust as
applied to conduct and transactions other than cartels and
mergers that produce monopoly or cartel behavior.
LDCs' perspective on antitrust-which tends to be in accord
With certain U.S. policies of the 1960s---is against power,
exploitation, and exclusion of the weak by the powerful. It is not
pro-efficiency; it is anti-power and anti-bullying. Most LDCs have
no interest in following a muse of increased aggregate wealth in
the world when their own people lag at the low end of wealth and
opportunity. They are deeply concerned with distribution and
deeply convinced that a redistribution of wealth and power and a
focus on opportunity for the less well-off are necessary conditions
for engagement of their nations in the world economic
enterprise. 3 5 The United States sharp disassociation from this
perspective in the 1970s led to the death of the UNCTAD project
on the Transfer of Technology (TOT). The clear commitment of the

United States to the aggregate welfare path in the 1980s and
1990s seems to assure that a TOT will never be resurrected.
The death of the TOT project is handwriting on the wall for
world-IP-antitrust rules such as proposed by a group of scholars
that convened in Germany and Switzerland from 1991 to 1993
(the Munich Group) and submitted a Draft International Antitrust
Code to GATT Director General Peter Sutherland in July 1993. 36
The Munich Group's draft is the principal proposal on the point,
and because it is an example of what an antitrust code on
intellectual property might be, this Article devotes the next few

See Eleanor M. Fox, Harnessing the Multinational Corporation to
35.
Enhance Third World Development-The Rise and Fall and Future of Antitrust as
Regulator, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1981 (1989).
36.
The group consisted of Josef Drexl, Wolfgang Fikentscher, Eleanor M.
Fox, Andreas Fuchs, Andreas Heinemann, Ulrich Immenga, Hans Peter KunzHallstein, Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Walter R. Schluep, Akira Shoda, Stanislaw J.
Soltysinski, and Lawrence A. Sullivan.
Two members of the group, including the author, urged a more minimal
approach, which is set forth in the form of 15 principles at the conclusion of the
introduction in point VIII. The proposed draft code is printed in [Special
Supplement] 64 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1628 (Aug. 19, 1993).
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paragraphs to describing the code, its wisdom, and its
acceptability.
The Munich Group's Draft International Antitrust Code treats
intellectual property in a separate article. The introductory
section provides that abusing a dominant position by obtaining or
exercising intellectual property is prohibited. Pooling to suppress
technology or raise price is prohibited. Further, "when the
exploitation of an intellectual property right exceeds the limits of
its legal content, any resulting restraint of competition may be
illegal under the provisions of this Agreement."
A comment gives further content to what clauses in
intellectual property licensing agreements may be legal or illegal.
"Legal" clauses include obligations to procure goods and services
from a given source if necessary for satisfactory exploitation of an
invention, minimum royalty and quantity terms, field of use
restrictions, restrictions on sublicensing and assignment,
obligations not to reveal the licensor's know-how even after
expiration of the patent if the know-how remains secret, to
cooperate in infringement actions, to observe quality standards,
to grant reciprocal non-exclusive licenses on improvements, and
to grant a most-favored terms clause. On the other hand, the
licensor may not exact obligations not to challenge the validity of
a licensed right, and the parties may not agree to respect the
licensed right after the right has expired, unless the owner of the
right proves that "the limits of the legal content are not exceeded."
For know-how licenses, an obligation not to use the licensed

know-how at the end of the agreement may not be justified under
certain circumstances but not if the know-how has become public
knowledge by means other than the licensee's breach of contract.
The Munich Group's Draft Antitrust Code is far less
restrictive of IP rights than the draft TOT Code, yet it similarly
purports to write antitrust rules for intellectual property divorced
from economic market analysis; it is largely a list of rules rather
than an analytical framework, and it is a catalogue of what might
be perceived as fair or unfair in the exploitation of intellectual
property given presumed disparity in bargaining power, rather
than a framework for analyzing what conduct suppresses
competition and harms buyers, on the one hand, and what
conduct advances invention and the diffusion of technology, on
the other.
The Draft Antitrust Code's set of competition principles for
intellectual property, particularly as spelled out in the comment
elucidating the rules, follow the pattern of European Community
block exemptions, which are regulatory formats.
Under the
European format, enterprises that include in their licensing
agreements only approved and mandatory clauses and no
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disapproved clauses normally have complied with the competition
law requirements and, moreover, need not file their agreements.
Contrariwise, "black list" clauses that would defeat use of the
block exemption are generally prohibited under EC law.
For the same reasons that the TOT project failed, a Munich
Code version of IP-antitrust would fail. The United States would
want IP-antitrust rules only to open markets and advance rivalry,
efficiency, and technological progress. Some nations would want
IP-antitrust rules to prevent "unfair" extractions of terms-to
redistribute the wealth.
From a U.S. antitrust perspective, it is unhelpful to list what
is permitted. Everything should be and under U.S. antitrust law
is permitted unless it has net anticompetitive (not merely "unfair")
consequences. 37 Also from a U.S. antitrust perspective it is
unacceptable to prohibit restrictions out of hand or even
presumptively. For example, for package selling, one must first
analyze whether the intellectual property owner has market power
in a proper economic market for a tying product and must then
analyze the structure of the tied market and determine whether
the tie-in or package creates or increases economic power in the
market. 38
Differences in perspective would overwhelm commonalities.
D. Costs of InternationalizingIP-Antitrust

Even if agreement could be reached on IP-antitrust principles
by reasoning, cajoling, or bargaining, it is not necessarily wise to
codify such principles as world rules. Diversity is a good in itself.
It reflects both the different contexts and different needs of
nations and a healthy competition among systems. A rather
complete set of international rules would not be optimal for all

nations and, being virtually written in "concrete," they would be
difficult to change. 39 Moreover, international rules could entail
growth of a new bureaucracy, with attendant questions of
accountability. Finally, if intellectual property rules are developed

See Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 113 S. Ct. 884 (1993).
37.
38.
See U.S. IPAntitrust Guidelines, supra note 14.
What was good for the United States in the 1960s (the "Nine No Nos")
39.
is no longer good for the United States in the 1990s. See Wilson, supra note 21.
Flexibility facilitates adaptation.
For these and related reasons, convergence of the nations' laws through
intensive cross-fertilization may be a better course. See Eleanor M. Fox & Janusz
Ordover. The Harmonizationof Competition and Trade Law--The Casefor Modest
Linkages of Law and Lirnits to ParochialState Action, 19 WORLD COMPETITION L. &

ECON. REv. 5 (1995).
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separately from the body of antitrust, they will lose their context
and bearings, and therefore the law that evolves will not be as
sound as it can be. Intellectual-property-antitrust rules should
be cut from the whole cloth of antitrust.
IV. A FOCUSED PERSPECTIVE

In this Part the author first suggests focusing attention on
restraints related to intellectual property that may impair trade or
harm global competition. Second, the author relates concerns
about intellectual property restraints to general principles of
antitrust.
A. An Antitrust-TradeLaw of Intellectual Property
In view of the high costs and uncertain benefits of a broadscale internationalization of IP-antitrust law, the author turns to
a more focused task and asks what antitrust problems likely to
attend acquisition, use, or licensing of intellectual property may
significantly impact trade or world competition. It is these areas
and probably only these areas that would seem to merit world
dialogue in contemplation of new international principles.
The substantive subject areas most likely to be impacted are
areas involving (1) market access and anticompetitive exclusion
and (2) anticompetitive collaborations of competitors designed to
raise prices (e.g., pooling and cross-licensing as a cover for a
cartel, rather than to liberate the use of conflicting patents).
The latter type violations-covers for cartels--are historically
well-known. Since at least the days of Hartford-Empire40 and
Timken Roller Bearing Co.,41 intellectual property rights have been
used to veil competitors' agreements to divide the world.
The market access problem may appear in many forms.
Cartelists, under false cover of intellectual property, may sustain
a boycott against outsiders, depriving them of market entry. An
alliance of important competitors that promises enhanced world
service (e.g., seamless telecommunications) may nonetheless hold
monopoly IP rights that would enable them to discriminate
against or exclude outsiders. A single-firm monopolist may
maintain its monopoly by anticompetitive misuse of IP rights (e.g.,
by attempts to enforce expired rights, as in United States v.

Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945), clarffied In
40.
324 U.S. 570 (1945).
41.
Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
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Pilklngton plc);42 or by contracts with tying effects, as in United
States v. Microsoft.4 3

An IP owner with monopoly power may

maintain its monopoly by granting a license to its only potential
competitor and requiring an exclusive grant-back of technology,
effectively excluding the licensee from entering the market on its
own. Two firms, one of which is the only technological competitor
of the other, might merge, eliminating the only important
research and development competitor (as in GM/ZKF).44
All of these problems have an international dimension. That
a problem has an international dimension, however, does not
mean that it should be solved by international rules. So as not to
intrude unnecessarily on nations' choices, nations' autonomy,
and the value of diversity, one might favor the European
subsidiarity principle, holding that what can best be handled at
the national level should be handled at the national level.
Applying the subsidiarity principle, one would inquire whether
45
each of the above problems can be handled well by national law.
With the aid of the effects doctrine and some expected benefits
from positive comity, the answer is, largely, yes. Indeed, most of
these fact patterns have occurred and have been satisfactorily
handled without the need to resort to international law.
Yet, there are limits to national law and national vision, and
justify a
the needs of competition in the global marketplace
46
modest conception of international competition policy.
B. InternationalAntitrust
The antitrust intellectual property problems posed in Part
IV.A are general antitrust problems. They are problems about
market power and its anticompetitive misuse. In many of these
problems, the market power happens to be derived or reinforced,
at least in part, from a state grant of intellectual property rights.
The intellectual property grant, to be sure, carries with it certain
special privileges, informing the interface of competition law and
TRIPS, 47 but the general body of antitrust law remains a

1994-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,842 (D. Ariz. 1994) (consent judgment).
42.
1995-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,096 (D.D.C. 1995) (consent judgment).
43.
44.
See Complaint, United States v. General Motors Corp., Civ. No. 93-530
(D. Del. filed Nov. 16, 1993).
45.
See Eleanor M. Fox, Jurisdiction and Conflicts in the Global Economy:
Crafting a Systems Interface in Festschrft for Valentine Korah, In 1995 EC
COMPETITION L. Y.B. J. Kallaugher and P. Alexiadls, eds., forthcoming 1996).
See Fox, supra note 27; Fox & Ordover, supra note 39.
46.
For example, patent holders are entitled to exclude infringing
47.
products.
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sympathetic framework for solving the problems. The stategranted nature of the privilege is a factor relevant in assessing the
strength of the market power.
This Article gives examples in Part IV.A that are in fact
exemplary of conduct restraining trade and competition, whether
or not entailing intellectual property rights. In other words, one
might naturally consider the IP-world-antitrust problem
subsumed by the world-antitrust problem.
The author has proposed elsewhere a system of principles of
constitutional dimension linking trade and competition. 48 The
principles would be written and enforced largely as national law
on the national level, with a right of recourse to dispute resolution
in the context of the WTO. The proposed system is especially
congenial to IP world-antitrust problems, and it is symbiotic with
the principles of and methodologies for enforcement of TRIPS.
The proposal suggests two and only two principles of
substantive antitrust law for international consideration, on the
theory that violation of either of these two principles would
materially interfere with the openness of the world trading system
secured by the successive rounds of the GATT. The first rule is
an anti-cartel rule (applicable to cartels with world effects),
accompanied by a right of nations to adopt focused, nonparochial
exceptions tailored to the needs of the nation's internal market.
The second rule is a market access rule, assuring that nations do
not use private restraints to replace the dismantled public trade
restraints.
Most nations have such rules, but the formulations differ and
the rules are not always enforced. The first qualification is not
the important one.
The differences in formulation are
insignificant from the point of view of trade restraints; the
differences are not barriers to trade. The second qualification is
the important one, and accordingly a credible and legitimate
enforcement mechanism is the focus of the proposal.
The fact that nations' rules differ in language and that
nations would not lightly agree to change their language is a
potential problem that the proposal finesses. Each nation is
exhorted to adopt the two principles (anti-cartel and pro-market
access) into its own law and to enforce its law. It may use
whatever language it chooses, as long as the rule of law is
transparent and non-discriminatory. The nation's own law will
apply whenever the principal harm to competition occurs within
that nation's borders.

48.

Fox, supra note 27.
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The nations would be required to accord adequate discovery
rights and rights of access to their courts for adjudication.
Aggrieved nations and possibly private parties would have a right
of complaint and adjudication. If due process for non-nationals
appears to be unavailable, aggrieved nations and persons would
have a right of enforcement in their own nation; but still, the
defendant would have the right to application of its own law if the
principal effects on completion were in its nation. Alternatively,
recourse to WTO panel adjudication would be available. The WTO
panel would also apply the law of the nation wherein competition
Applying a cosmopolitan principle, which the
was harmed.
nations themselves would be enjoined to do, the panel would treat
benefits and harms to competition, efficiency, and technological
progress anywhere in the community of member nations as
seriously as the excluding nation's law treats those impacts that
fall within its own borders. Recourse to WTO.panel adjudication
would be available also in the event of a pattern of

nonenforcement that undermines trade and world competition.
These linking principles are, it is proposed, the appropriate
measure of internationalized antitrust to complement the
obligations of nations under TRIPS.

V. CONCLUSION

TRIPS does not invite an international antitrust law of
intellectual property nor is one needed or advisable. In view of
TRIPS, however, and in order to perfect TRIPS, it will be necessary
to develop law at the interface of competition law and intellectual
property law to ensure that overly aggressive competition law does
not undermine the obligations under TRIPS. Such law should be
developed on a case-by-case basis, and presumptively, the
existing competition law principles of nations should be respected
as legitimate and not in derogation of TRIPS.
While separate world principles of IP-antitrust would be
inadvisable, dialogue should progress to develop principles linking
antitrust to trade, especially at the market access interface.
These principles would logically address the misuse of intellectual
property to bar market access and thus undermine world trade.

